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


26 March 1964

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# CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN



State Dept. review completed

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## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE BULLETIN

26 March 1964

### DAILY BRIEF

Cyprus: The UN peace-keeping force in Cyprus will be formally constituted today, according to UN officials in New York, and the UN mediator expects to arrive by the middle of next week.

President Makarios objects to U Thant's including the 950 Greek and 650 Turkish troops now in Cyprus in the peace-keeping force. The Greek Cypriots apparently fear that acceptance of these contingents might prejudice Nicosia's campaign to terminate the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Treaty of Alliance.

[Support for union of Cyprus with Greece ("enosis") is continuing to develop among Greek Cypriots, [redacted]

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[redacted] When violence broke out between Greek and Turkish Cypriots last December, there was little obvious support for enosis, although it had been the rallying cry of the Greek Cypriots in the struggle against the British during the 1950s.]

[Recently, however, there have been pro-enosis demonstrations in several cities, and most of the non-Communist Greek Cypriot press now calls for union with Greece as the final political "settlement" of the Cyprus dispute.]

[The Greek Cypriot Emergency Force (GCEF), the irregular organization which has done most of the fighting against Turkish Cypriots, has reincorporated into its oath a pledge to "fight for enosis" which had been dropped last fall. New recruits must further pledge to "fight against Communism," a promise not required previously.]

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(\*) Many Greek Cypriot elements are also demanding the return to Cyprus from Athens of General George Grivas, the militant anti-Communist leader of the underground EOKA organization from 1955 to 1959. Minister of Interior Georkadjis, principal leader of the GCEF, is supporting Grivas' return and the enosis movement. He probably aims by these means to undermine the political power of Makarios.)

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DAILY BRIEF

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\*Zanzibar: Pro-Communists hold all key government posts following yesterday's cabinet shuffle.

In the ten weeks since African nationalists ousted the dominant Arab elite, pro-Communists have moved to neutralize nationalists, eliminate all moderate pro-Western influences, and tie the islands economically and militarily to the Communist bloc. Two Moscow-trained labor leaders who played a major role in this maneuver have now taken over the Ministry of Finance and Development, and the Ministry of Communications and Works.

The former ministers of finance and education--both moderates--have been assigned to Washington and London, with pro-Communists as their deputies. Although both ministers were leaders in President Karume's Afro-Shirazi Party, they were his prerevolutionary rivals and their transfer may have had his approval.

There is no indication that any confrontation between Karume and the pro-Communists is imminent. He has appeared indifferent to the pro-Communists' maneuvers and decrees, which are disguised as Black African socialism.

Karume's newly appointed executive assistant is a Moscow-trained protégé of Vice President Hanga, a self-styled Marxist with a Russian wife.

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DAILY BRIEF

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South Korea: [Opposition party leaders are promoting the student demonstrations in hopes of creating a situation which will lead to the overthrow of the Pak government]

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[ ] the demonstrations were directly instigated by former President Yun Po-sun's Civil Rule Party (CRP). The CRP's aim is to bring the demonstrations to a point where the students will be joined by the general populace and by any discontented military elements.]

[This plan appears to be supported by the opposition Democratic Party, which has issued an inflammatory statement demanding that the government break off its negotiations with Japan to avoid signing a "traitorous agreement."]

[The demonstrations spread yesterday from Seoul to the provinces. President Pak has instructed the authorities to avoid bloodshed in controlling the students, but some incident might spark widespread violence. In similar circumstances in 1960, the army refused to fire on the students to save the Rhee regime]

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DAILY BRIEF

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Gabon: [President Mba still shows no disposition to conciliate his now formidable opposition, and further trouble may be in the offing.]

[The US Embassy in Libreville reports that Mba is becoming more confident and intransigent as the scheduled 12 April elections draw nearer. Unless Paris applies pressure, the embassy believes he will probably use increasingly repressive and brutal measures to stay in power.]

[Mba is receiving strong support from influential private French interests in Gabon, notably Roland Bru, a wealthy French businessman who has long claimed to be "the real government" of the country. Bru is reputed to have top-level connections in Paris, and this may account in part for the French Government's failure to force Mba to follow the conciliatory course avowedly favored by the Quai d'Orsay.]

A commission established to investigate the 18 February military coup has indicted Mba's principal political opponent, Jean Aubame. There is considerable concern in Libreville, shared by the embassy, that the imprisoned Aubame may be executed or murdered before the elections. Aubame has become the hero of the growing number of anti-French Gabonese. Further action against him could well provoke new antigovernment and anti-French disturbances.

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Belgium-Congo: Belgium's relations with the Congo have improved as a result of Foreign Minister Spaak's mid-March visit to Leopoldville.

During Spaak's visit, a tentative agreement was reached on sharing the public debt that the Congo had acquired before independence. This agreement may be formalized in a treaty, possibly by 30 June. Negotiations appear to be progressing on the extremely complicated problem of transferring the former colonial government's shares of businesses and utilities to the Adoula government. Adoula and Spaak also agreed on the need for supplying increased numbers of Belgian technicians to assist the Congo.

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Libya: Prime Minister Muntassir continues to believe that pressures for the removal of Western bases from Libya will not ease. He feels that negotiations should start within one month, but has told the US ambassador that he recognizes that sudden liquidation of the bases is both unreasonable and impracticable. Muntassir says he believes a phase-out of two or three years would be reasonable, but the Libyan Government is likely to press for an earlier date when negotiations begin.

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